Code of Practice for Action to be Taken in the Event of an Accident or Incident Involving OTP
Background

A sub-group of the M&EE Networking Group have looked at the arrangements for action to be taken in the event of an accident or incident involving OTP. The M&EE Networking Group recommend this COP as good practice for the industry.

M&EE COPs are produced for the benefit of any industry partner who wishes to follow the good practice on any railway infrastructure. Where an infrastructure manager has mandated their own comparable requirements, the more onerous requirements should be followed as a minimum for work on their managed infrastructure.

The M&EE Networking Group makes no warranties, express or implied, that compliance with this document is sufficient on its own to ensure safe systems of work or operation. Users are reminded of their own duties under health and safety legislation.

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M&E Networking Group Code of Practice for Action to be Taken in the Event of an Accident or Incident Involving OTP

Sign off
The M&E Networking Group agreed and signed off this Code of Practice 09 October 2019 and published on 07 December 2019.

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Purpose
This Code of Practice details the actions to be taken and by whom, following an accident or incident involving On Track Plant (OTP).

Scope
This Code of Practice concerns accidents and incidents involving OTP. It does not cover locomotives, wagons or on track machines.

This Code of Practice deals with the engineering technical aspects of incident management. With regard to accidents and incidents companies should have robust contingency plans in place to deal with the consequences of any accident or incident including the relieving of personnel who are not deemed fit to continue with their duties. Guidance on contingency planning is included in COP 0002 Planning for the use of mobile operated plant.
### Definitions

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<td>Accident</td>
<td>Unplanned, uncontrolled event giving rise to death, ill health, injury or other loss or damage to personnel, OTPs or infrastructure.</td>
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<td>Collision</td>
<td>Any unintentional contact of an OTP with any other OTP, structure, building, construction, overhead line equipment, railway track including third/fourth rail equipment, personnel and livestock etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consist</td>
<td>Two or more items of OTP coupled together [normally in the form of towing OTP and trailer(s)].</td>
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<td>Defect Reporting</td>
<td>Defects including urgent safety related defects should be reported in accordance with COP 0012 Code of Practice for Safety Related Defect Reporting for OTP, Plant and Equipment.</td>
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<td>Derailment</td>
<td>Where one or more rail wheels have unintentionally come off, and remain off, the rail.</td>
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<td>Dragging brakes</td>
<td>Unintended continuous application of the brakes on an OTP or OTPs either when the related controls are in the release position, or where a brake has been or becomes partially or fully applied during transit.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incident</td>
<td>Unplanned, uncontrolled event, which under different circumstances could have resulted in an accident.</td>
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<td>Infrastructure Manager</td>
<td>For the purposes of this document, this is the organisation under whose control the railway is managed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Machine Controller</td>
<td>For the purposes of this document, this is the person responsible for supervising the safe use of OTP.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operator</td>
<td>For the purposes of this document, the Operator, when written with a capital ‘O’, means the company responsible for the site operation of the OTP.</td>
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<tr>
<td>operator</td>
<td>For the purposes of this document, the operator, when written with a lower case ‘o’, means the person who is handling the controls of the OTP.</td>
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<td><strong>OTP</strong></td>
<td>Vehicle with rail wheels capable of running on railway track, limited by their engineering acceptance to running within a possession only. For the purposes of this Code of Practice they are split into three main groups: Demountable machines, road-rail vehicles (RRVs) and trailers.</td>
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<td><strong>Quarantine</strong></td>
<td>To separate and restrict the movement of an item of OTP immediately, in order to prevent post incident alterations.</td>
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<td><strong>RAIB</strong></td>
<td>Rail Accident Investigation Branch (applies to UK only).</td>
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<td><strong>Re-railing</strong></td>
<td>In the context of this COP re-railing means putting an OTP back on track following a derailment.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Responsible Manager</strong></td>
<td>In the context of this Code of Practice, a person responsible for undertaking specific tasks in relation to site safety and OTP movements.</td>
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<td><strong>Runaway</strong></td>
<td>Uncontrolled or unintended movement of any OTP along the track.</td>
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<td><strong>Service Brake</strong></td>
<td>A service brake is a progressive brake used in dynamic conditions, for which the brake force can be infinitely varied, or stepped, by the operator using a control to simultaneously apply brakes on all connected OTPs, except where fitted with UIC air brakes compatible with mainline trains. Stepped should be interpreted as having sufficient steps to achieve all foreseeable braking requirements.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Technically competent person</strong></td>
<td>Person agreed by OTP owner or Operator, who by virtue of training and experience, is able to identify inspection and testing requirements and make decisions for the specific OTP concerned.</td>
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</table>
1. Basic requirements

1.1. Action following an incident or accident

1.1.1. Operators should have in place a documented system of the actions necessary for reporting, recording, examination and testing after accidents and incidents of all types.

1.1.2. The first priority following any accident or incident should be the safety and security of the railway network, safety of staff, other personnel and other railway users.

1.1.3. Recommendations for initial safety are contained within section 2 with additional recommendations for specific types of accident or incident made in the following sections:

Section 2    Safety of People, Equipment and Infrastructure
Section 3    All Collisions and Derailments (including incidents of overturning and point run-throughs)
Section 4    Brake defects
Section 5    Incidents involving allegations of excessive speed
Section 6    Fire

1.1.4. Check lists are included in Appendix A to act as an aide-memoir to this code of practice.

1.1.5. Depending on the severity of the accident or incident an additional investigation could be undertaken by other parties (Rail Authorities, Health and Safety enforcement agencies, Police, etc.). Where the Operator investigates the accident or incident, the investigation should be commensurate with the occurrence. In all cases the cause of the accident or incident should be established. The Operator should determine the competency of their personnel who undertake this investigation work.

1.1.6. Where the Operator is responsible for the investigation, they should have in place arrangements to ensure the following:

   a) records (including photographs where appropriate) are made at the scene of the incident or accident of the condition/state of any components/assemblies which could be pertinent to the potential causes of, or contributing factors to, the incident or accident

   b) competent people are used for all the actions

   c) appropriate and calibrated equipment is used
d) appropriate precautions are taken to ensure safety if the OTP is to be left in the “as found” condition before and during a transit move to a test location

e) suitable instructions and check lists, for all reasonably foreseeable situations, are in place and available

f) Relevant information is transmitted to those needing to know for:
   i) corrective action to be taken
   ii) defect reporting
   iii) accident/incident investigation
   iv) recording purposes

g) that collected evidence is preserved until such time that it is no longer required
2. Safety of People, Equipment and Infrastructure

2.1. Initial safety

2.1.1. Initial action by operator

2.1.1.1 Once the operator is aware that the OTP has become involved in an accident/incident they must STOP all movements. The operator should decide whether it is safest to remain in the seat or leave the OTP.

2.1.1.2 Where possible the operator should assess the situation and report any relevant information to the Machine Controller.

2.1.2. Initial assessment

2.1.2.1. The Machine Controller’s first duty should be to assess the situation and follow the processes detailed by the Infrastructure Manager to ensure safety of people and the railway. The Machine Controller’s assessment should consider the following as a minimum:

- safety of self, workforce and the public
- lines potentially fouled
- overhead line equipment
- DC third or fourth rail
- environmental impact
- potential consequential hazards

2.1.2.2. Once immediate dangers have been assessed and mitigated the Machine Controller should inform the Responsible Manager of the situation.

2.1.2.3. If for any reason the Machine Controller is incapacitated the operator should make direct contact with the Responsible Manager.

2.1.2.4. The Responsible Manager should attend site and assess the situation and determine the next course of action.

2.1.2.5. The Responsible Manager should assess the operator to determine their fitness to continue operating. Where the Responsible Manager is in any doubt about the fitness of the operator, they should seek medical advice (first aid, emergency services etc. depending on the seriousness of the incident) and follow the processes detailed in their contingency plan.
2.1.3. Risk of further instability

2.1.3.1. The Responsible Manager should assess the situation of the OTP to establish:

- the likelihood of the OTP moving
- what measures could be taken to make the OTP stable whilst not causing inadvertent movement
- where it is not possible to secure the OTP against movement an appropriate exclusion zone shall be established

Where feasible the Machine Controller and operator should also be involved in this assessment.
3. All Collisions and Derailments (Including Incidents of Overturning and Point Run Throughs)

3.1. Incident Assessment

3.1.1. Initial assessment

3.1.1.1. Once the initial safety measures have been taken the Responsible Manager should make an assessment of the severity of the incident.

3.1.2. Damage to the OTP

3.1.2.1. Following any collision or derailment the operator, Machine Controller and Responsible Manager (depending on 2.1.2.4) should examine the OTP for:

- obvious signs of damage to the rail wheels, brakes, axles and road wheels & tyres where fitted
- any other areas of impact damage
- any sign of fluid leakage (this will require spill kits to be deployed immediately as appropriate)
- damage to lifting accessories or ancillary equipment caused by snatched load or other unintended movements or overloads.

3.1.2.2. Where following the examination detailed in 3.1.2.1 above it is considered the OTP has experienced significant damage, the Responsible Manager should arrange for attendance of a technically competent person to check for:

- damage to the rail wheels, axles and road wheels & tyres where fitted
- damage to any other areas of machine
- damage to brakes and braking equipment
- fluid leakage, even where spill kits have been deployed, a further assessment should be undertaken and any remedial action identified
- damage to lifting accessories or ancillary equipment caused by snatched load or other unintended movements or overloads
- distortion to, or misalignment of, the rail gear and OTP frame
- obvious damage to linkages and control systems
3.1.2.3. For a serious collision or derailment (including all instances of overturning irrespective of cause), or where there is obvious damage disabling the OTP, recovery should be arranged, and the OTP must be quarantined for further inspection. Recovery of the OTP shall be undertaken in accordance with COP 0027 OTP Recovery.

3.1.2.4 Where the collision or derailment involves OTP being towed/propelled, the couplings and other connections should be examined to ensure no damage has occurred during the collision or derailment, on the OTP involved and all attached OTP.

3.1.3. Reporting

3.1.3.1. All collisions and derailments should be recorded by the operator in the OTP log book.

3.1.3.2. The operator should ensure that the OTP owner is informed of any collision or derailment.

3.1.3.3. The Responsible Manager should ensure that where appropriate the Operator's control centre is informed. The control centre should escalate investigation as necessary.

3.1.3.4. The Machine Controller must report all points run-through to the Responsible Manager. N.B. A point's run-through could affect the signals on lines outside of the possession, hence the importance that this is reported before any assessment of damage.

3.2. Recovery of OTP

3.2.1. Re-railing

3.2.1.1. Providing the examination in 3.1.2.1 has deemed the OTP is safe to be re-railed, the process of safely re-railing the OTP now needs to be established.

3.2.1.2. Providing there is no obvious significant damage to the track, the Responsible Manager, Machine Controller and operator should jointly agree how best to re-rail the OTP.

3.2.1.3. Where significant damage to track has occurred such that re-railing of the OTP is not practical, the requirement of clause 3.3.2 should be followed.

3.2.1.4. The limitations for on/off tracking, of each individual OTP, must be taken into account. Generally, these do not allow the OTP to be on-tracked in situations of high and adverse cant. The OTP must be on-tracked in line with the manufacturer's general guidance for on/off tracking.
3.2.1.5. Where the OTP remains upright and next to the track on which it was previously operating, guidance is given for on tracking OTP in M&EE COP0007. For RRVs this should be achieved by driving the RRV back into the correct position by means of the road wheels only. Consideration should be given to avoiding further damage to the railway infrastructure. The use of the boom arm (on RRV excavators) as an aid is inadvisable.

Note This is not permitted on Network Rail managed infrastructure

3.2.1.6. For RRVs, where the point of derailment is in an area which the guidance in COP0007 is unsuitable, and the OTP is capable of moving along the track on road wheels to a suitable point then this should be done.

3.2.1.7. If the OTP cannot be moved along track, and the side shift arrangements (fitted to some OTP) will not get itself back onto the rail, then:

a) the Operator should arrange suitable temporary preparations, e.g. temporary access ramps or wooden packing, to level the area, and make on-tracking possible. or

b) the Operator should arrange for a competent person to attend and move the OTP across and onto the track with jacks or crane.

Note Temporary access equipment must be removed after re-railling.

3.2.1.8. Where the derailment has involved OTP being towed or propelled, these should be disconnected from the towing OTP before re-railing. Note that when trailers are disconnected and/or subsequently put onto the track this should be undertaken in accordance with the requirements of M&EE COP0014.

3.2.1.9. After the OTP has been successfully on-tracked the operator should carry out a full function test. This should include (with assistance as necessary):

- the operation and effectiveness of the brakes
- ensuring that all rail wheels are turning freely with no wheel bearing noises
- checking rail and road axle locking cylinders for correct operation and setting before attempting to travel the OTP
- checking for fluid leaks

3.2.1.10. The Machine Controller and operator should assess the OTP for its ability to continue normal working operation.
3.2.11. Where the Machine Controller has any doubt about the OTP they should arrange the attendance of a technically competent person. The technically competent person will permit the continued use of the OTP or arrange for it to be off tracked at a suitable location, and quarantined where necessary, for further inspection.

3.2.2. Recovery where re-railing is not practicable

3.2.2.1. Where the OTP is at a precarious angle, overturned, or where methods in 3.2.1 are not possible (due to damage to OTP, location etc.) the recovery should be managed by the Operators’ control centre – who will arrange for attendance by specialist rail recovery engineers. The use of other OTP on site should not be used to upright OTP which has overturned or is at a precarious angle.

3.3. Assessment of damage

3.3.1. Damage to track

3.3.1.1. The Machine Controller must report the incident giving the precise track mileage to the Responsible Manager. The Responsible Manager will make the judgement as to whether the track can be used without further inspection, or the level of further inspection required and by whom.

3.3.2. Damage to infrastructure/apparatus/cables

3.3.2.1. The Responsible Manager must examine the site for obvious damage. Where the Responsible Manager considers that the derailment has had sufficient impact on the infrastructure, (including electrification equipment, signalling cables etc.) they should report their concerns to the Infrastructure Manager who will ensure the possession will not be handed back until the site has been examined and passed fit by engineers approved by the Infrastructure Manager.

3.3.3. Other damage

3.3.3.1. The operator and Machine Controller should examine the object the OTP collided with for obvious signs of damage.

   a) Where this is a bridge, or any structure above or below the railway, this must be reported to the Responsible Manager for escalation to the Infrastructure Manager immediately (irrespective how minor the collision).

   b) Where this is any other concrete/ brick structure it must be reported to the Responsible Manager who will either assess potential damage themselves, or make arrangements for an assessment by a suitably qualified competent person.
c) Where this is overhead line equipment or third/fourth rail equipment, it must be reported to the local electrical control room.

d) Where this has been as the result of a points run-through the operator and Machine Controller must report the run-through to the Responsible Manager. The Responsible Manager should inform the Infrastructure Manager’s Operations Centre, who will arrange examination of the track work and point gear.

e) Where this is any other structure the operator and Machine Controller should assess for damage – if they have any doubts they should report immediately to Responsible Manager.

f) Where this is another OTP the operator of the OTP that has been hit and Machine Controller should together examine the point of impact on the OTP for any obvious damage. They should then make an assessment, depending on their findings, of what further action and testing needs to take place. The collision must be reported in the log book of the OTP that has been hit and of the OTP that ran into it. If the OTP that has been hit is unattended the Machine Controller should contact the OTP owner (name and number as displayed on side of OTP) to report the collision.

g) Where this is personnel or livestock the Machine Controller should immediately arrange medical attention (doctor or veterinary). The operator and Machine Controller should assess for damage to the OTP once the person or animal is attended to.

Note If for any reason the Machine Controller is incapacitated the operator should make direct contact with the Responsible Manager to undertake the examination for other damage as detailed above.
4. Brake defects

4.1. Types of incident

4.1.1. Brake related incidents

4.1.1.1. Brake related incidents fall into two basic categories:
- defective brakes (or allegation of poor braking or loss of braking)
- dragging brakes

4.1.1.2. When notification of such an incident is received, the actions in the following sections, relating to each category of incident, should be taken.

4.1.2. Brake tests for defective brakes or allegations of poor brakes or any incidents of Signals Passed at Danger (SPAD)

4.1.2.1. Operators should have in place management procedures to cover the actions to be taken following the report of a signal passed at danger. It is recommended that in all cases of signals passed at danger the brakes of the OTP involved are tested as described in this section.

4.1.2.2. Where there is any allegation of poor/defective brakes or signal passed at danger the OTP must be immediately taken out of service and the brakes tested as described in this section.

4.1.2.3. Operators should ensure a technically competent person carries out brake tests which are sufficient to determine whether or not the brakes and/or braking system were responsible for, or contributory to, the incident. They should include test record sheets and where appropriate cover two broad types of tests:
   a) those for hand brake or parking brake
   b) those for the service brake to test for its effectiveness. Key parameters should be measured, recorded and compared with specified values and tolerances.

Note Brake tests should be undertaken in accordance with M & EE COP 0025

4.1.2.4. Where an allegation has been made of an OTP having poor brakes the OTP should be immediately checked at very slow speed to check whether the brakes are working at all, with necessary precautions to prevent a runaway. Once this is confirmed the OTP should be tested by the technically competent person in accordance with its maintenance plan prior to recommencing any work. (Note that an allegation of poor brake found during COP0014 testing should be dealt with as specified in COP0014).
4.1.2.5. Where an allegation of poor brake has been made against a OTP whilst towing, the towing OTP and other OTP in the consist shall be tested together, preferably without touching any intermediate connections and couplings.

4.1.2.6. Any allegation of poor brake should be recorded in the OTP log book (together with track and weather condition and any action taken on site).

4.1.2.7. If the parking brake has been applied whilst the OTP is still moving this must be reported in the OTP log book and appropriate checks instigated to determine the impact of the application (the application of the parking brake could cause damage on some OTP designs).

4.1.2.8. Any OTP that fails the brake test should be quarantined until repaired. The operators' control centre should be advised.

4.1.3. Dragging brakes

4.1.3.1 If an OTP is noticed with a suspect dragging brake (i.e. wheel not rotating) the movement must be stopped immediately, and the cause found.

4.1.3.2 Before returning the OTP to use the operator should examine the wheels for signs of damage, especially wheel flats and signs of overheating. The limits of acceptable tread damage will be specified by the OTP manufacturer. If the operator is in any doubt concerning the wheel condition the OTP should be examined by a technically competent person.

4.1.3.3 Any incident of dragging brake should be recorded in the OTP log book (together with any action taken on site).

4.1.3.4 Where damage has been found on the rail wheels (normally significant flats) this must be reported to the Responsible Manager to arrange inspection of the rails.
5. Incidents involving allegation of excessive speed

5.1. Initial assessment

5.1.1 When an allegation of excessive speed is made the Machine Controller should stop the OTP and report this to the Responsible Manager.

5.1.2 Confirmed occurrences of over speeding should be reported to Infrastructure Manager’s Operations Centre. Where it is obviously operator error the OTP operator should be dealt with as per the Operator’s procedures and reported to the Responsible Manager (if outside worksite) and Operator’s control centre.

5.1.3 Where the operator has inadvertently incurred an overspeed, the following equipment, where fitted on the OTP, should be examined by a technically competent person:

- Speedometer
- engineering means for limiting speed
- audible device for warning of overspeed

5.1.4 Any incident of alleged speed indication or control device defect should be recorded in the log book (together with track and weather condition and any action taken on site).

5.2. Testing of speed indicating and control systems

5.2.1 Tests of speed indicating systems may be required as the result of actions taken after an incident. In all instances the testing should be carried out by a technically competent person. The testing should first be carried out without adjustment to the system.

5.2.2 The speedometer test should embrace the whole of the speed range of the speed indicating system, as far as is practicable and should cover:

- accuracy of readings or indications using manufacturers instruction
- inspection for intermittent or jerky operations
- determination of clarity, cleanliness and illumination of the indicators
- assessment of integrity of connections and components that cannot be included in the test

5.2.3 The limiting device and audible warning device should be tested as per manufacturer’s instructions.
6. Fires

6.1. General

6.1.1 All staff should be aware of their responsibilities as shown in the Infrastructure Manager’s Rules

6.2. Initial assessment

6.2.1 When the operator is aware of a fire on the OTP they should immediately stop the OTP and apply the handbrake. Note that where practicable the OTP should be stopped in a position not on a bridge/viaduct or in a tunnel or in a station. The operator should then assess their ability and that of any other personnel to egress the OTP – if necessary, with the aid of a fire extinguisher.

6.2.2 The operator, once in a position of safety, should report the fire to Machine Controller before making any attempt to extinguish the fire.

6.2.3 The Machine Controller should inform the Responsible Manager

6.2.4 If the fire is so severe that it cannot be extinguished immediately, and the adjacent line is open to traffic the Responsible Manager should contact the signalman as described in the Infrastructure Manager’s rules. Where the site is under overhead line equipment or in third/fourth rail area the Responsible Manager should immediately inform the electrical control room or arrange for this to be done.

6.2.5 Where the fire is so severe that it cannot be extinguished and the signalman has been informed, the signalman will arrange attendance by fire brigade. Where the signalman has not been informed the Responsible Manager will arrange fire brigade attendance.

6.3. Post fire assessment

6.3.1 Once the fire has been extinguished an assessment should be made as to whether it is safe to re-enter the OTP. Where the fire brigade has attended the incident, they should give permission before anyone approaches the OTP.

6.3.2 When it is considered safe to re-enter and before anything is restarted, an assessment should be made by the operator and Machine Controller, and where necessary a technically competent person, to agree the cause of the fire.

6.3.3 Once the cause is agreed, and the risk of re-ignition is not probable, a visual examination should be made of the affected area. Where damage is found which could cause OTP defects the OTP should be declared a total failure and the Machine Controller should make arrangements to tow the OTP to a suitable location.
6.3.4 Where no (or very little) damage is found, before normal operation commences the following checks should be made:

- Brakes
- Lights
- Functional check of all systems whose electrical circuits could be in area of fire
- Functional check of all hydraulic, pneumatic, and fuel systems whose pipe work could be in the area of the fire

6.3.5 All fires, irrespective of how small, should be recorded in the OTP log book. Note it is recognised that where the OTP has been extensively damaged by fire the log book is unlikely to be capable of use.

6.3.6 The Responsible Manager must ensure that details are recorded with the Operator's control centre. The control centre will escalate the investigation as necessary.

6.4. Damage to infrastructure

6.4.1. The Responsible Manager should examine the site of any reported fire to assess the infrastructure for potential damage.

6.4.2. The Responsible Manager should assess the scale of the fire and where the site is under overhead line equipment or third/fourth rail area should consider the need to inform the electrical control room.
7. Quarantine arrangements

7.1 The following should be considered by the Operator when quarantining OTP after an incident:

a) Make the OTP safe (all actions should be recorded).
   i) If necessary, off track the OTP to a safe position and in some cases move to the storage site. (A preferential storage site would include a covered area with lockable doors to prevent OTP movement).
   ii) Unauthorised access should be restricted.
   iii) No further movement, adjustment or use of the OTP is allowed without authorisation from the investigating body.

b) Ensure all documentation is left within the item of OTP and secured.

c) The OTP should not be repaired, serviced, maintained or cleaned.
### Appendix A  Check lists

#### Derailment

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#### Collision or point run through

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<td>3.2.2</td>
<td>Other damage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.1</td>
<td>Additional requirements following serious incident</td>
</tr>
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#### Brake defects

<p>| | |</p>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Type of incident</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Defective brake – allegation poor brake</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Defective brake – OTP not stop</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defective brake – signal passed at danger</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dragging brake</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Test for defective brake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
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## Incidents involving allegation of excessive speed

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## Fires

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<td>6.3.5 - 6</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.4.1</td>
<td>Assessment of damage to infrastructure</td>
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<td>6.4.2</td>
<td>Assessment of damage to electrification equipment</td>
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